By Jan Sammeck
The concept of self-regulation as an tool able to mitigating socially bad practices in industries - resembling corruption, environmental degradation, or the violation of human rights - is receiving massive attention in idea and perform. via coming near near this phenomenon with the speculation of the recent Institutional Economics, Jan Sammeck develops an analytical procedure that issues out the severe mechanisms which come to a decision concerning the effectiveness of this software. by way of integrating conception with functional examples of self-regulation, this learn highlights the need to examine the institutional incentives of an undefined, so as to come to a legitimate judgement in regards to the feasibility and effectiveness of this software in a given situation.
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Extra resources for A New Institutional Economics Perspective on Industry Self-Regulation
Any cooperative interaction, which means following a certain ex-ante announced path of action ex-post, becomes costly if one interacting party defects from their promise of action. 106 In a world of potentially opportunistic and maximizing actors, cooperation will not be achieved, as defection is the dominant strategy. Although a collectively higher payoff can be achieved through cooperation, no individual has an incentive to unilaterally change his course of action. e. 107 In the context of this study, the prisoner’s dilemma manifests in the conflict between the mutual interests of avoiding costs incurred in transactions with relevant stakeholders, and 105 Ahn et al.
The strategy for the individual to not cooperate turns out to be the dominant strategy, given that it cannot know how others will behave, or – given the maximization paradigm – that it must assume that others will defect. In an empirical setting, the likely consequence will be that the regime either dissolves or that it lowers its de facto standards, in such a way that its commitment to ethical standards is less credible. 126 Thus, if the hazards associated with utility maximization through strategic behavior may be perceived to be prohibitive, cooperation will not be sustained or not initiated in the 124 For example: In a highly competitive environment, the first actor to defect may force others into defecting, due to the competitive disadvantage they experience.
119 See also Barnett and King (2008). 120 Ostrom (1998, p1); note within the context of this study, the difference between short term and long term gains receives particular emphasis, since the problem of self-regulation often entails conflicts between short-term profits and long-term interests of reputation. 121 Akerlof (1970); such a case exists when transaction partners can differentiate between firms for whom they will increase transaction costs, and those for whom they do not.
A New Institutional Economics Perspective on Industry Self-Regulation by Jan Sammeck